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Knowledge of Africa, Knowledge by Africans: Two Perspectives on African Studies
* 
 
How African are the so-called African Studies? The study of Africa, as developed so far by a long 
intellectual tradition, is part of an overall project of knowledge accumulation initiated and 
controlled by the West. This article advocates an active, lucid, responsible appropriation by 
African societies themselves of the knowledge capitalised over centuries about them. It advocates 
more generally the development in Africa of an autonomous, self-reliant tradition of research and 
knowledge that addresses problems and issues directly or indirectly posed by Africans. It calls 
upoŶ ͞épistéŵologies du Sud.͟ It calls upon African scholars in African Studies and in all other 
disciplines to understand that they have been doing so far a kind of research that was massively 
extraverted, i. e. externally oriented, intended first and foremost to meet the theoretical and 
practical needs of Northern societies. It invites a new orientation and new ambitions for research 
by Africans in Africa. 
Keywords: African Studies; research; knowledge; Southern epistemologies. 
 
A la mémoire de John Conteh-Morgan 
 
1. By African Studies we usually mean not just one discipline but the whole range of 
disciplines that take Africa as a subject of study. Among other such disciplines are often 
ŵeŶtioŶed ͞AfƌiĐaŶ histoƌǇ,͟ ͞AfƌiĐaŶ soĐiologǇ aŶd aŶthƌopologǇ,͟ ͞AfƌiĐaŶ liŶguistics,͟ 
͞AfƌiĐaŶ politiĐs,͟ ͞AfƌiĐaŶ philosophǇ,͟ etĐ. A fiƌst ƋuestioŶ theƌefoƌe ďeĐoŵes uŶaǀoidaďle: 
is there any kind of unity between these disciplines? Do they just relate to Africa each on its 
own without being anyhow interrelated? Are they simply juxtaposed to one another while 
studying the same object from different angles and perspectives, or are they instead 
interdependent in such a way that they are bound to grow or fade together? One easily 
perceives the implication: if these disciplines do not need one another, if each of them can 
flourish by its own without drawing on any neighbouring discipline, then there is no need to 
put them together in the same institution, no need to create institutes of African Studies, let 
alone something as big as BIG-SAS is expected to be. 
We assume actually that these disciplines are somehow interrelated and we have good 
reasons to do so. Between African history and African sociology, for instance, there is 
                                                 
*
 Article originally published in RCCS 80 (March 2008). It is a revised version of a lecture delivered during the 
opening ceremony of the Bayreuth International Graduate School of African Studies (BIGSAS), University of 
Bayreuth, Germany, on December 13, 2007. I am grateful to the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation for giving 
me the possibility to have another three months research stay in Germany during that period. My first 
Humboldt fellowship dates back to the years 1980-1982. I was hosted by the Philosophy Institute of the 
University of Düsseldorf, then directed by the late Professor Alwin Diemer. 
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obviously an objective complementarity inasmuch as the present situation of any society 
derives directly or indirectly from its past. On the other hand, a good knowledge of the 
pƌeseŶt aŶd of the logiĐ of eǀeŶts iŶ todaǇ͛s life ŵaǇ giǀe useful iŶsights iŶto the 
comprehension of the past. Synchrony therefore refers to diachrony and vice-versa. History 
and sociology are just an example. Similar relations can be found between all the disciplines 
that constitute African Studies. 
There is more, however. Beyond the special links that unite disciplines studying the same 
object, there is an overall solidarity between the sciences both intellectually and historically. 
Not only do the so-called African Studies rely on methodologies and theories which 
consolidated in various fields, like general history, sociology, linguistics, economics, political 
science, etc., long before they were applied to Africa as a new field of study, but moreover, 
as everybody can see, BIG-SAS is part of the Institute of African Studies, which itself is part of 
the University of Bayreuth, i.e. an institution where many other disciplines, including 
mathematics, physics, computer science, biology, chemistry, geology, business and 
administration, philosophy, engineering, are taught and researched in, in addition to African 
Studies and to the mother disciplines of African Studies themselves. And it is the same 
everywhere. This institutional setting is not peculiar to Bayreuth. It clearly indicates how 
deeply the different areas of research are interconnected. Such interconnection, as is well 
known, is at the root of the very idea of university (Universitas) as was thematised among 
others by a man who was not only a thinker but also the real founder of the 
Wissenschaftspolitik in 19
th
 century Germany: Wilhelm von Humboldt. 
 
2. There is at least one more question: how African are the so-called African Studies? By 
African history, for instance, we usually mean the historical discourse on or about Africa and 
not necessarily a historical discourse coming from Africa or produced by Africans. In 
grammatical terms we mean the history of Africa: historia Africae in Latin, where Africae, 
the genitive of Africa, would be said to be an objective genitive rather than a subjective 
genitive. In the same line, African sociology or anthropology means the sociology or 
anthropology of Africa as an objective genitive, that is a sociological or anthropological 
discourse on Africa and not a sociological or anthropological tradition developed by Africans 
within Africa. Similarly, African linguistics is understood as the study of African languages 
and not necessarily a study by Africans. Imagine a group of African scholars studying 
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Japanese, for instance, or English, German or Portuguese. They would not be said to be 
contributing to the development of a linguistic research tradition in Africa. Instead they 
would be said to be doing Japanese linguistics, English, German or Portuguese linguistics. 
In my own intellectual development I was sensitised to this problem and started 
peƌĐeiǀiŶg it as a pƌoďleŵ ǁhile ƌeadiŶg ďooks oŶ ͞AfƌiĐaŶ philosophǇ͟ oƌ AfƌiĐaŶ sǇsteŵs of 
thought. The authors usually assumed that Africans themselves were not conscious of their 
own philosophy, and that only Western analysts observing them from without could give a 
systematic account of their wisdom. Father Placide Tempels, a Belgian missionary working in 
the former Belgian Congo, must be credited for giving the most explicit formulation of this 
assumption: 
 
Let us not expect the first Black-in-the-street (especially if he is young) to give us a systematic 
account of his ontological system. Nevertheless this ontology exists; it penetrates and informs 
all the pƌiŵitiǀe͛s thiŶkiŶg aŶd doŵiŶates all his ďehaǀiouƌ. UsiŶg the ŵethods of aŶalǇsis aŶd 
synthesis of our own intellectual disciplines, we can and therefore must do the ͚pƌiŵitiǀe͛ the 
service of looking for, classifying and systematizing the elements of his ontological system. 
(Tempels, 1969: 15) 
 
And further on: 
 
We do not claim that the Bantus are capable of presenting us with a philosophical treatise 
complete with an adequate vocabulary. It is our own intellectual training that enables us to 
effect its systematic development. It is up to us to provide them with an accurate account of 
their conception of entities, in such a way that they will recognize themselves in our words 
aŶd ǁill agƌee, saǇiŶg: ͞You haǀe uŶdeƌstood us, Ǉou kŶoǁ us Ŷoǁ ĐoŵpletelǇ, Ǉou ͚kŶoǁ͛ iŶ 
the saŵe ǁaǇ ǁe ͚kŶoǁ͛. (Tempels, 1969: 24) 
 
What is wrong about this alleged unawareness of the natives about their own philosophy 
is that the latter is said to be the most self-conscious discipline, at least in a certain 
philosophical tradition, precisely the one in which I had been brought up myself: the 
philosophy of consciousness as developed from Plato to Descartes, Kant and Husserl, to 
mention just a few important landmarks in this tradition. 
What bothered me most was the fact that an increasing number of African intellectuals 
were stepping in the same direction. African academics doing philosophy in or outside 
Western universities spent most of their time writing M.A. theses, Ph.D. dissertations, 
articles, books, conference papers or monographs of all sorts on such topics as the 
philosophy of being among the people of Rwanda, the concept of time among the people of 
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East Africa, the perception of the old man among the Fulas of Guinea, the Yoruba conception 
of human being, Yoruba metaphysical thinking, moral philosophy among the Wolof, the 
Akan doctrine of God, the conception of life among the Fon of Dahomey, etc. I found these 
topics interesting per se and some of the monographs particularly insightful. But I could not 
admit that the first duty, let alone the only duty of African philosophers, was to describe or 
reconstruct the worldview of their ancestors or the collective assumptions of their 
communities. I contended therefore that most of these scholars were not really doing 
philosophy but ethno-philosophy: they were writing a special chapter of ethnology aimed at 
studying the systems of thought of those societies usually studied by ethnology
1
 – however 
such societies are defined or characterised.
2
 
At the same time, however, I drew attention to the very existence of these monographs. 
To me they were part and parcel of African philosophy in a radically new sense. In my view 
African philosophy should not be conceived as an implicit worldview unconsciously shared 
by all Africans. African philosophy was quite simply philosophy done by Africans. There was a 
contradiction in Western philosophy while thinking of itself as the most self-conscious of all 
intellectual disciplines and at the same time assuming that some non-Western philosophies 
could be self-unconscious. 
I drew attention, therefore, to the existence of an African philosophical literature. The 
very first sentence of my little book, African Philosophy, Myth and Reality, made this 
                                                 
1
 As is ǁell kŶoǁŶ, the ǁoƌd ͞ethŶo-philosophǇ͟ ǁas used iŶ the eaƌlǇ seǀeŶties alŵost at the saŵe tiŵe ďǇ ŵǇ 
colleague Marcien Towa from Cameroon and myself in a derogatory and polemical sense (Hountondji, 1970; 
Towa, 1971). But the word itself was older. It dates back at least to the early forties when Nkrumah used it in a 
quite positive sense to describe a discipline to which he himself wanted to contribute. As mentioned in his 
autobiography, Nkrumah got his M.A. in philosophy in 1943 at the University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, and 
ƌegisteƌed sooŶ afteƌ foƌ a Ph.D. iŶ ͞ethŶo-philosophy.͟ He aĐtuallǇ ǁƌote the thesis ďut Đould Ŷot defeŶd it 
before leaving in 1945 to Britain, where he served as secretary to the fifth Pan-African Congress. I am indebted 
to Williaŵ Aďƌahaŵ foƌ pƌoǀidiŶg ŵe ǁith a ĐopǇ of the tǇpeǁƌitteŶ ŵaŶusĐƌipt. The ǁoƌd ͞ethŶo-philosophǇ͟ 
already appears in the title: Mind and Thought in Primitive Society: a Study in Ethno-Philosophy with Special 
Reference to the Akan Peoples of the Gold Coast, West Africa (Nkrumah, 1945; 1957). 
2
 There is a broad consensus today that notions traditionally used to identify the kind of societies studied by 
ethnology (as opposed to sociologǇͿ aƌe stƌoŶglǇ EuƌoĐeŶtƌiĐ aŶd iŶ this seŶse ďiased oƌ ͞ideologiĐal.͟ “Đholaƌs 
are at pains to explain exactly what they mean by ͞pƌiŵitiǀe͟ soĐieties. AlteƌŶatiǀe ŶotioŶs supposed to ďe 
more politically correct, suĐh as ͞aƌĐhaiĐ͟ soĐieties, ͞tƌaditioŶal͟ soĐieties, ͞iŶdigeŶous͟ peoples, etĐ., aƌe Ŷot 
much clearer. Describing ethnology as the study of ͞illiteƌate͟ soĐieties is Ŷot ďetteƌ eitheƌ, insofar as the 
societies concerned are thus characterised negatively by something which they doŶ’t have: literacy. It is more 
productive to pay attention to the specific ways and devices through which knowledge is transmitted without 
using writing in the way it is used in the West. For this reason they should be called, as suggested by the French 
linguist Maurice Houis, ĐivilisatioŶs de l’oƌalité – oral civilisations. Mamoussé Diagne, a philosopher from 
Senegal, has carefully analysed in his Critique of Oral Reason this ͞logiĐ of oƌalitǇ,͟ as opposed to the logiĐ of 
writing described by Jack Goody, and the impact of this specific way of transmission on the knowledge 
produced (Houis, 1971; Goody, 1986; Diagne, 2005). 
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stateŵeŶt ǁhiĐh ŵaǇ appeaƌ ƌetƌospeĐtiǀelǇ todaǇ as a ͞vérité de La Palice,͟ a 
commonplace idea, something quite simple indeed, which, however, due to the intellectual 
and ideological landscape of the time, seemed extraordinarily new: ͞BǇ AfƌiĐaŶ philosophǇ I 
mean a set of texts͟ (Hountondji, 1977, 1983). If this book has made such a strong 
impression, to the extent of being awarded the Herskovits prize in Los Angeles in 1984 and 
being more recently selected in 2002 at the Zimbabwe International Book Fair in Harare 
among the hundred best African books of the 20
th
 century, it must be due to this simple and 
apparently naive statement whose implications and consequences, however, were far-
reaching. 
One immediate implication was this: the new concept of African philosophy allowed a 
distinction between Africanists and Africans in the field of philosophy. Many Western 
thinkers who wrote extensively on African systems of thought could no longer be viewed as 
belonging to African philosophy in the new sense, while the works by their African 
counterparts were part of the African writings in ethno-philosophy and therefore were part 
and parcel of the African philosophical literature. This does not mean that the works by 
Africans were better in any sense of the word. Besides, nobody can ignore the thematic 
solidarity or even the intellectual complicity between African and non-African ethno-
philosophy, nor deny the genealogic filiation that makes African ethno-philosophy the 
daughter of Western engagement with exotic worldviews. Drawing this kind of demarcation, 
however, made it possible to call attention to the African reception of Western research 
traditions and get African scholars to face their own intellectual responsibility. 
There is still another implication: African philosophy also includes writings that criticise or 
question ethno-philosophy, which clearly indicates that there is no unanimity whatsoever 
within Africa on this specific issue. Equating African philosophy with African philosophical 
literature made it possible to perceive the internal debates and contradictions, the 
intellectual tensions that make this philosophy a vivid one, and African culture as a whole a 
living, not a dead culture. Ethno-philosophy was based, among other assumptions, on the 
idea that, in small-scale societies or so-called primitive societies, there was total unanimity 
and, so to say, everyone agrees with everyone. Moreover, this alleged unanimity was viewed 
as a virtue, and dissent as something bad or dangerous. I called this double assumption the 
unanimist illusion. I drew attention instead to the virtue of pluralism as a factor of progress 
and to the fact that not only modern Africa but even the so-called traditional Africa have 
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been experiencing pluralism over time in all domains. As far as philosophy is concerned, this 
kind of pluralism appeared to me as something most valuable and fruitful (Hountondji, 
2002). 
Needless to say, African philosophy extends to a whole range of works that have nothing 
or very little to do with the specific issue of the existence of African philosophy, and 
therefore cannot just be classified along the line Ethno-philosophy vs. Critical Philosophy. 
Some writings develop African attempts to think, rethink or simply understand Western 
philosophy and appropriate, so to say, non-African traditions of thought. They give birth to 
African interpretations of Descartes, Kant, Hegel, Marx, Husserl, the Critical School of 
Frankfurt, Islamic thinkers, maybe tomorrow Indian and Chinese philosophies, and many 
other intellectual traditions from outside Africa. Some others work on universal issues and 
concepts, including issues on mathematical logic or the foundations of science, the history 
and sociology of science, the anthropology of knowledge, ethics and political philosophy, 
philosophy of language, etc. Such attempts, of course, are part and parcel of African 
philosophy. 
 
3. Now, how does all this apply to African Studies? In a sense, the study of Africa is stamped 
with a kind of original sin in view of the objective role it played in the history of colonisation. 
In the case of Germany the problem is even more serious, given the way the discipline was 
instrumentalised during the period of national-socialism. 
This, however, is part of history. The historical complicity has been denounced again and 
again not only by non-Western scholars but also, and this is more important, by Western 
scholars themselves. Moreover, as far as the Hitlerian period is concerned, there must have 
been at the very height of this awful dictatorship at least some shy protests which could not 
be loudly articulated unless one wanted to commit suicide. I would assume, as was written 
recently by a German anthropologist, that, ͞despite pƌoŵiŶeŶt eǆaŵples, it ǁould ďe 
misleading [...] to see all ŵeŵďeƌs of AfƌiĐaŶ studies as plaǇiŶg aŶ aĐtiǀe ƌole iŶ Hitleƌ͛s 
Germany. The appropriate picture was rather, as Dostal has called it, silence in darkness͟ 
(Probst, 2005; Dostal, 1994). 
Despite this original sin, therefore, Western scholarship including German Afrikanistik has 
made a huge contribution to the knowledge of African languages, societies, history and 
cultures. Some names remain unforgettable, suĐh as Adolf BastiaŶ, the ͞fatheƌ of the 
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German Völkerkunde,͟ to use the ǁoƌds of aŶ African anthropologist;3 Carl Meinhof, the 
specialist of Bantu languages; Diedrich Westermann, who was missionary in Togo before 
starting his brilliant career as an anthropologist; Leo Frobenius, whose work contributed a 
lot to giving Black writers like Aimé Césaire and Léopold Sedar Senghor better awareness of 
the fundamentals and value of their own culture; Janheinz Jahn, who was so strongly 
impressed while listening to a lecture by Senghor in 1951 that he started almost immediately 
͞his uŶtiƌiŶg ĐolleĐtioŶ aŶd tƌaŶslatioŶ of AfƌiĐaŶ liteƌatuƌe͟ (Probst, 2005: 415); and nearer 
to us a man like Ulli Beier, who founded in Bayreuth the institution called iŶ GeƌŵaŶ ͞Iǀa-
leǀa Haus͟ ;ďeĐause the souŶd ͞ǁ͟ like ͞ǁiŶdoǁ͟ iŶ EŶglish does Ŷot eǆist iŶ GeƌŵaŶͿ, 
where the Yoƌuďa pƌoŶouŶĐes ͞Iǁa leǁa͟ – ͞ďeautǇ is ĐhaƌaĐteƌ,͟ e.g., ͞the ďeautiful 
woman is the one who behaves well.͟ We cannot forget the late Georg Elwert, to whom the 
peasants of Ayou, the village in Benin where he did most of his fieldwork, paid a vibrant 
homage in October 2006.
4
 
As an external observer I would probably not describe, as Peter Probst does (2005: 405), 
African Studies iŶ GeƌŵaŶǇ as ďeiŶg ͞ďetǁiǆt aŶd ďetǁeeŶ [...] two major spheres of 
influence,͟ the French and the British ones – assise entre deux chaises, as would be said in 
French: sitting between two chairs without its own identity. Instead, the German tradition 
seems to me the model of what we should try to build in Africa. First, it speaks its own 
language, German. Second, by way of implication, it addresses primarily a German-speaking 
audience and evolves first and foremost as an internal debate within Germany and German-
speaking countries, including Austria and part of Switzerland, where scholars question one 
another, respond to and discuss with one another. Third, the debated issues are significant 
for, and largely shared by, the German-speaking academic community – which allows the 
development of a horizontal and self-sustained debate. We are not in a situation where the 
individual scholar shares in a problematic developed elsewhere, say, in the French or the 
English-speaking world, over the shoulder of his/her own community. Fourth, debating 
                                                 
3
 See Diallo, 2001. 
4
 The villagers were invited to attend a two-houƌ sessioŶ iŶ ͞hoŵage to Geoƌg Elǁeƌt, a GeƌŵaŶ AfƌiĐaŶist 
(1947-ϮϬϬϱͿ͟ duƌiŶg aŶ international conference organised in Cotonou from 0ctober 16 to 19, 2006 by the 
African Centre for Advanced Studies. Instead of one or two delegates, they brought in a big delegation of 25 
people with drums and other sophisticated instruments. They explained in Aizo (a variant of Fongbe) what that 
man meant to them, recalling, among other things, how he taught them to write and read their own language, 
how he helped them to find out funds to sink wells and get drinking water in their villages. With permission of 
their elders, they executed sacred dances that could only be danced in special circumstances. This amounted, 
in fact, to organising a second burial ceremony. 
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endogenous issues does not amount to scientific autarky or intellectual self-imprisonment. 
Not only do some scholars publish part of their work in French or more often in English, the 
new lingua franca of international scholarship, in order to reach a wider audience, but it can 
be assumed that whenever a discussion originally launched in Germany becomes significant 
for the international scientific community, non-German scholars themselves feel the need to 
have it translated as soon as possible. 
This way of doing research can be said to promote an autonomous, self-reliant scientific 
activity. Instead, I am afraid the way we do research in Africa is just the opposite. Too often 
do we tend to investigate subjects which are of interest first and foremost to a Western 
audience. Most of our articles are published in journals located outside Africa and are meant 
therefore for a non-African readership. Even when we happen to publish in Africa, the fact is 
that African scholarly journals themselves are read much more outside Africa than in Africa. 
In this sense, our scientific activity is extraverted, i.e. externally oriented, intended to meet 
the theoretical needs of our Western counterparts and answer the questions they pose. The 
exclusive use of European languages as a means of scientific expression reinforces this 
alienation. The majority of our country people are de facto excluded from any kind of 
discussion about our research outcome, giǀeŶ that theǇ doŶ͛t eǀeŶ uŶdeƌstaŶd the 
languages used. The small minority who understands knows, however, that they are not the 
first addressees but only, if anything, occasional witnesses of a scientific discourse meant 
primarily for others. To put it bluntly, each African scholar has been participating so far in a 
vertical discussion with his/her counterparts from the North rather than developing 
horizontal discussions with other African scholars (see Taiwo, 1993, Hountondji, 1988a; 
1990; 1995; 2006). 
Am I going too far? No doubt this description would have been quite adequate fifty years 
ago or so. But things have changed ever since. We do have today in Africa, in the various 
fields of academia, national, sub-regional, regional scientific communities. We have 
universities and research centres and some of them are very good. We have brilliant 
scientists and scholars, and some of them are doing quite well. Despite all this progress, 
however, we are still a long way behind what should be perceived as our final goal: an 
autonomous, self-reliant process of knowledge production and capitalisation that enables us 
to answer our own questions and meet both the intellectual and the material needs of 
African societies. The first step in this direction would probably be to formulate original 
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͞pƌoďleŵatiĐs,͟ original sets of problems that are grounded in a solid appropriation of the 
international intellectual legacy and deeply rooted in the African experience (Hountondji, 
1988b; 1997; 2002). 
In this perspective, the discipline or set of disciplines called African Studies will certainly 
not have the same meaning in Africa as in the West. In Africa it is or should be part of a 
wider project: knowing oneself in order to transform. African Studies in Africa should not be 
satisfied with just contributing to the accumulation of knowledge about Africa, a kind of 
knowledge that is capitalised in and managed by the North as all other sectors of scientific 
knowledge. African scholars involved in African Studies should have another priority, which 
is to develop first and foremost an Africa-based tradition of knowledge in all disciplines, a 
tradition where questions are initiated and research agendas set out directly or indirectly by 
African societies themselves. Non-African scholars will then be expected to contribute to 
solving these questions and implementing these research agendas from their own 
perspective and historical background. 
Things should also happen in Africa, therefore, and not always or exclusively outside 
Africa. Fairness to the Black continent demands that all the knowledge accumulated 
throughout centuries on different aspects of its life be shared with the people who live 
there. It demands that adequate measures be taken to facilitate a lucid, responsible 
appropriation by Africa of the knowledge available, the discussions and interrogations 
developed elsewhere. Such appropriation should go hand in hand with a critical re-
appropriation of AfƌiĐa͛s oǁŶ eŶdogeŶous kŶoǁledges aŶd, ďeǇoŶd, a ĐƌitiĐal appƌopƌiatioŶ 







                                                 
5
 It has been shown in a convincing manner how deeply the study of Africa has impacted on the mother 
disciplines in the social sciences and humanities (Bates, Mudimbe & O͛Baƌƌ, ϭ99ϯͿ. While aĐkŶoǁledgiŶg this 
important fact, the point I am trying to make here is slightly different. Both these core disciplines and African 
Studies have been so far developing mostly in the West. But Africa should now develop its own process of 
questioning and accumulating knowledge, not only in the field of African Studies, but in all academic 
disĐipliŶes. IŶ this seŶse it should ďe Ŷoted that ͞‘eseaƌĐh iŶ AfƌiĐa,͟ as mentioned in the subtitle of the book, 
does not mean research within Africa, but just research about Africa or research in African Studies. The point 
here is that Africa should not be reduced to a subject of study. Geography matters. The more things are done in 
Africa the better for the present and future of this continent. 
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